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TITLE: POLITICS OF IDENTITY IN NEPAL – IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF
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Due to incredible socioeconomic stratification of society in the context of extreme
demographic and regional diversity, regionalism has been a crucial political issue for Nepal
during the recent democratic transition. The traditional power elite belonging to hill “high caste”
groups are trying to maintain the centralized power structure to protect their own interests. On
the other hand, various ethnic and regional identity groups, who have fought for autonomy and
self-rule, want their identity and rights to be recognized. Despite the promulgation of the federal
constitution by the Constitutional Assembly in 2015, many ethnic and regional identity groups
have expressed their opposition for the restructuring of the state based on territorial principle
which ignores their identity.
Despite the historical struggle of ethnic and regional groups, this research shows a
significant section of the voters belonging to these groups are divided on the federal question.
There is lack of internal cohesion, communication and solidarity within and across many of the
identity groups, despite the prediction of such cohesion by the existing theories of regionalism.
Scholars of regionalism assume that economic and social differences automatically produce
ethnic mobilization and regionalism. The case of Nepal shows that such assumption is not
always true as we do not find the extent of support for ethnic federalism prescribed by various
theories of regionalism.
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ABBREVIATIONS
“High-caste” group from the hill region traditionally engaged in performing
Hindu rituals and promotion of learning, following strict rules for food, drinking
and marriage
Chherti
“high-caste” group from the hills, traditionally engaged in military and governing
Dalit
The so called “low-caste” group in Hindu society, who live scattered across the
country. This group is also divided by an internal caste system; and are
traditionally engaged in different trades such as iron work (Kami), leather work
(Sarki), tailoring (Damai), and goldsmiths (Sunar).
Gorkha
One of the principalities in central hills of Nepal, which initiated a military
campaign to unite the country in 1776
ILO-169
ILO Convention on the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights, 1989.
Limbu
Ethnic group, living in the far eastern hills
Madhesi
Caste groups living in Eastern Terai, who claim that all people living there are
Madhesi
Magar
Ethnic group, living in western hills
NC
Nepali Congress, center right party
NEFIN
Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities, umbrella organization representing
ethnic groups of Nepal, established in 2002
Newar
Ethnic group living mostly in the Kathmandu valley, also known as Newa
PEON
“Permanent Establishment of Nepal”, or the elite groups of military top brass,
merchants, mendicants, mandarins and mediators (contractors) also known as M5
who traditionally control state power in Nepal
Rai
Ethnic group living in the eastern hills
RPP
Rastriya Prajantra Party, the far-right monarchist party, advocating for centralized
Hindu state and restoration of monarchy
Sugauli
Place in northern India, where the British-Nepal Treaty was signed in 1816. This
treaty is known as Sugauli (or Sugoli) Treaty.
Tamang
Ethnic group, living in the central hills of Nepal around the Kathmandu valley
Terai
Low lands in southern part of Nepal bordering India, sometimes also called as
Madhesh. It stretches from east to west of the country.
Tharu
Tribal Groups living in the Terai, who claim that they are not Madhesi and have
separate identity
UCPN(M) United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) also known as Maoists, which have
now split into various outfits
UML
United Marxists Leninists, Centre Left party in Nepal
Bahun
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Nepal has been selected for the current research because it is a country with incredible
socioeconomic stratification along with extreme diversity in demography and culture. Due to
such diversity, the question of ethnic and regional identity has become a prominent political
issue over the past decade as the country undertook the task of federal restructuring. The case of
Nepal is still more interesting because there is a proportional electoral system (along with ‘first
past the post’ system), which was introduced to encourage participation of even smaller regional
or ethnic identity groups. In spite of this, the ethnic and regional groups are divided in their
preferences regarding the federal question, due to which the dominant groups have benefitted in
maintaining their traditional power. How can we explain the federal question in Nepal? How
does the Nepal case stand in relation to the existing theories of regionalism? This research is
directed to find the answers to these important questions.

Figure - 1: Demographic Map of Nepal1
1

University of Texas, Austin. 2016. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/nepal_ethnic_80.jpg
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In order to understand the context of regionalism in Nepal, we need to look into the key
moments in its modern history as well as its socio-economic structure. In this chapter, I will give
a brief outline of the modern history of Nepal, which is important to understand the nature of
regionalism in the country. The socioeconomic structure will be discussed in a later chapter
(Chapter 3).
a). Brief History of Modern Nepal
Nepal is a country located on the southern slopes of the Himalayas. It is a landlocked
country bordering China’s Tibet region in the north, and India in the south, east and west. The
landscape varies from plain land in the south called the Terai-Madhesh; moderate hilly region in
the middle; and the high Himalayan mountainous region in the north. The country has a total
population of 26.5 million and is inhabited by people of Tibeto-Burmese, Aryan and local Tribal
origins, with 126 ethnic groups and indigenous nationalities, speaking 123 languages2.
The country came into existence in the second half of 18th century when Prithvi Narayan
Shah, one of the kings of the Gorkha principality in the central hills, initiated a military
campaign against other principalities and established a unitary state3. As the king belonged to the
“high-caste” group from the hill region, he established a state where the religion, culture and
language of the ruling caste achieved dominant position.
The control of the state by the “high-caste” group led to their political, economic and
cultural domination over the country which marginalized the other ethnic and regional groups.
Some ethnic groups like the Limbu in the Far East, who protested against the Gorkha rule, were
later pacified by giving them limited autonomy. Keeping in mind the expanding British
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Government of Nepal, Central Bureau of Statistics. “Population Monograph of Nepal” Vol-II, 2014.
In 1769, King Prithvi conquered Kathmandu valley (which was known as “Nepa” in the local Newari language) and
established Gorkha Kingdom there. The name of the country was later changed to “Nepal”, possibly to appease the
local ethnic Newari population, who were unhappy with the military occupation by the King of Gorkha.
3
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colonization of the plains in neighboring India, the newly established state was more interested
in consolidation of its power through security of its borders and collection of taxes. The state
recruited officers for government jobs from the dominant group. At the local level, however, it
allowed the ethnic and regional groups to practice their religious and cultural traditions4 and tried
to harmonize the situation for the maintenance of the new regime5. After the Anglo-Gurkha War
of 1814-16, Nepal lost one-third of its territory in the south, east and west. The Treaty of Sugolee
(1816)6 allowed the British to recruit the men from the hill ethnic groups into the British Army.
In 1846, one of the military generals belonging to the Rana clan, captured power through
a military coup and established hereditary rule of Rana Prime Ministers that lasted for about a
century (1846-1950). The Ranas gave the king a ceremonial role, and did not allow education or
development in the country. They kept the country in complete isolation from the outside world
by prohibiting foreigners from visiting the country. As the Ranas made a lot of enemies among
the ruling clans, they established close ties with the British rulers in India for the survival of their
regime. They allowed the Indian businessmen to come to Nepal to trade which gradually ended
the trade monopoly of the local ethnic Newars of Kathmandu. The Ranas continued the same
policy as the Shah Kings vis-à-vis the ethnic and regional groups.
The popular uprising of 1950, however, ended the Rana rule and established democracy
for the first time leading the country towards modernization. But, Nepal’s first tryst with
democracy was short-lived. Threatened by the mobilization of the diverse groups in the
democratic process, the ruling classes (landlords and courtiers belonging to the Shah and Rana
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Prithvi Narayan, the founder of Nepal had understood the importance of making peace with the diverse caste and
non-caste ethnic groups for the stability of his regime and had said that “Nepal is a garden of 4 castes and 36
ethnicities”.
5
The ethnic Newars of Kathmandu Valley had exclusive trade rights with Tibet, and the king of Gorkha allowed
them to continue the trade and did not allow the merchants from India taking it over.
6
The Treaty of Sugauli, Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Sugauli
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clans) conspired against democracy. Taking advantage of the post-democratic chaos of 1950s,
the king took power through a military coup in 1960 and established a “party-less” Panchayat7
system.
During the period of 1960-1990, the country took the path towards modernization but
under the autocratic rule of the monarchy. The monarchy started the hill “high” caste oriented
nationalist campaign of homogenization (“Nepalization”), by claiming that Nepal is a country
with “one ethnicity, one language, one dress and one nation”.
However, the popular uprising of 1990 ended the autocratic Panchayat system and
established constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy. The new regime provided
political space for the ethnic groups to participate in the political process. But the ruling elites
were able to maintain the status of “Hindu state” in the new constitution and rejected demands
for a secular state, regional autonomy and identity based representation.
Again, in 2005, at the height of Maoist civil war (1996-2006), the king took over power
with the help of the military, curtailed political rights and jailed political leaders. The second
popular movement against the monarchy took place in 2006, and was successful in restoring
democracy. This time, the elected constitutional assembly abolished the monarchy in 2008,
declared Nepal as a secular, federal democratic republic, and established the principles of
proportional representation for all ethnic and regional groups in the state structures.
In spite of these achievements, the political actors representing traditional political forces
and the emerging regional and ethnic identity groups strongly differed on the principles and
goals of restructuring of the state. The traditional political elites advocated for non-ethnic
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The Panchayats were the informal village assemblies of local elites, who traditionally used to settle local disputes
in the villages. The new regime formalized these Panchayats by introducing elections, but these Panchayats were
just an embellishments and a cover for the autocratic rule of the Monarchy.
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territorial division, whereas the elites of the emerging identity groups demanded ethnic and
identity based restructuring. Although the 2nd Constitutional Assembly in 2015 adopted a
constitution based on non-ethnic restructuring8, the elites of the identity groups were not satisfied
with the provisions in the constitution, and their campaign for the revision of the constitution is
on-going.
b). The research topic and its relevance
Although Nepal has been a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic country, the traditional ruling
elites have suppressed the ethnic and regional groups and ruled the country throughout most of
its modern history by establishing a centralized unitary state. Every time Nepal’s democratic
political forces attempted to institutionalize the rights of the diverse ethnic and regional groups
through a democratic and secular constitution, the traditional hill “high caste” Hindu elite (also
labeled as the permanent establishment of Nepal – PEON9), who have entrenched themselves in
the state structures, have suppressed the demands of the regional identity groups in order to
safeguard their political and economic interests. Therefore, the inclusion and rights of diverse
ethnic, regional and minority groups have been a crucial political issue over the past six decades.
The traditional ruling elite do not want to lose their power, but the hitherto oppressed
ethnic, linguistic, regional groups want recognition of their identity through equitable
representation and devolution of power. To achieve this goal, the identity groups have been
demanding the restructuring the traditional unitary state and the establishment of federal units
based on ethnicity and regional identity. The question of regionalism in Nepal is so critical that
the first constituent assembly (2008-12) was unsuccessful in drafting a new federal constitution.
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The Constitution of Nepal, 2015. http://www.nepalembassy-germany.com/pdfs/Constitution_full_english.pdf
One renowned political analyst, CK Lal, has defined the PEON of Nepal as 5-M: military top brass, mandarins,
merchants, mendicants and mediators (contractors). See CK Lal, “The Conservative Consolidation”, The Republica,
August 13, 2016. http://admin.myrepublica.com/opinion/story/25232/the-conservative-consolidation.html
9
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The second constituent assembly (2013) finally adopted the constitution in 2015 by deciding to
have seven federal states based on non-ethnic principle, although this decision was not accepted
by the identity groups who have continued their struggle by demanding revision of the federal
structure.
The continued political instability even after the adoption of the new constitution
indicates that the issue of identity and regionalism in Nepal has not been adequately addressed
by political actors. Therefore, the study of the issues of ethnic, linguistic, caste, religious and
regional identities in Nepal and their necessary resolution for national integration has acquired
not only academic but also practical political significance.
The key tasks of this research are to 1) assess the extent to which ordinary voters and
political party preferences regarding the federal question varied during the recent election; 2)
estimate the level of unity of preferences between ethnic voters and political parties representing
them; and 3) make recommendations for the solution of the federal question in Nepal.

7

CHAPTER 2
THEORIES OF REGIONALISM

Regionalism is a political theory that examines the interests and political aspirations of
group(s) of people living in a particular region of a country who may feel that they have been
marginalized by the central state based on ethnicity, language or culture and want to have access
to power and resources through decentralization, autonomy, or secession from the state. The
theory of regionalism is relatively new. Scholars have been studying this question especially
after the end of WWII that led to the creation of new states following decolonization. As many
national and regional groups around the world started claiming their political rights, the United
Nations adopted the principle of “national self-determination” (UN Charter) and the “rights of
indigenous and tribal peoples” (ILO Convention 169).
In order to study the regional question in Nepal, I have used various theories of
regionalism, including Dependency Theory, Internal Colonialism, Primordialism, theory of
Social Communication, and Institutional Theory.
Dependency Theory was developed in the 1950s which tried to explain the structural
relation of dependency between the developed “core” and the backward “periphery” which was
thought to lead to the rise of nationalist, regionalist and secessionist movements in developing
countries (Rokkan, Urwin, 1982). Based on the Dependency theory, Internal Colonialism
suggested that economic exploitation and cultural domination by the Centre helps strengthen
identities in cultural regions as a response to it (Hechter, 1975). Hechter also claimed that the
process of industrialization increases economic inequality between the center and regions and the
resulting unequal industrial development creates dependency of the periphery on the center. He
also claimed that the dominant Centre will use its administrative policies and structures to
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institutionalize the existing stratification in the periphery in order to reinforce its dominant
position (Hecter, 1975, page 9). If Hechter’s theory is true, then it means that the allegedly
internal colonial approach of the center creates strong internal unity in the different social strata
in the periphery, and generates loyalty and commitment of the masses to their own
ethnic/regional political leadership to fight the domination of the center.
Samuel Huntington (1968) argued that democratic transition in the emerging multi-ethnic
societies of states that gained independence after WW II could be destabilizing as these states
might not be able to balance political development with modernization pressures due to a lack of
institutions. He claimed that transition from autocratic rule to democracy will liberate hitherto
oppressed groups and enable them to participate in the political process. However, as these new
groups do not find institutional space for participation and for sharing of power, these groups
become alienated form the political process leading to conflict in the society. In this research,
analysis has been made how far the alienation of the new groups by the state affected the
preferences of the masses of the regional identity groups towards making a unified response
against the dominant elites who control the state.
Clifford Geertz (1973) proposed the concept of Primordialism to explain the continued
relevance of nationalism and regionalism in new states. He believed that group identity emerges
naturally as a result of very long period of cohabitation of group members who are linked
through common history, language, culture, kinship, religion, region etc. and these bonds
coalesce to form primordial identities. If Geertz’s theory is true, we shall see a strong correlation
between the demands of the ethnic and regional parties with the individual preferences of the
voters during elections.

9

Karl Deutsch (1953) argued that Social Communication affects the extent of regionalism.
Deutsch believed that social communication plays a prominent role in the formation of
nationalities during the transition of societies to modernity. He claimed that the process of
modernization increases social mobilization and communication within the marginalized groups.
Deutsch argued that members of the marginalized group communicate more effectively and
intensely with individuals within the group than those from the outside, which could reinforce
regional and national identities. He also suggests that states can in some instances build ties
across ethnic groups through the flow of standardized information (“standard stream”) in order to
assimilate those groups into the dominant culture. The ethnic groups will also have the “peculiar
stream” of information from the past experiences of their community. The interaction between
standard stream and peculiar stream will generate a “feedback stream” as a response of the group
to the assimilation efforts of the state through the standard stream. Deutsch concludes that
assimilation or dissimilation of the ethnic group will depend on whether the “standard stream” or
“feedback stream” gets the upper hand (Karl Deutsch, page 91-92).
In Nepal, since 1990s, various forms of communication have been developed. If
Deutsch’s theory is true, then we shall see how far the increased opportunities for
communication contributed to generate common preferences among the marginalized groups and
their political parties on the federal question10. We can also measure the extent of national or
regional mobilization as an indicator of the processes of assimilation or dissimilation taking
place among the diverse ethnic and regional groups in Nepal.

10

Experts believe that development of the media in Nepal is one of the major achievement of the democratic
process of recent years. Along with the vast number of newspapers and TV channels, community radios are
proliferating in the country. There are above 200 local FM radios spread across 74 out of 75 districts. For more, see
Association of Community Radio Broadcasters Nepal. 2016.
http://www.acorab.org.np/index.php?pagename=aboutus
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CHAPTER 3
REGIONAL STRUCTURE OF NEPAL
a). Nepal’s Demographic Structure

Figure - 2: Ethnographic Map of Nepal11
Nepal’s demography is extremely diverse. The population can be divided broadly into two
groups: caste groups and non-caste (ethnic) groups. Caste groups belong to the Hindu system of
social hierarchy, where Brahmins and Chhetri occupy dominant positions; and Dalits are the
“low caste” who are also known as the “untouchables”. On the other hand, there are about 100
non-caste ethnic groups with native areas in certain regions of the country. (See Map-2 above).

11

Mark Turin, “Harka’s Maps”. Nepali Times, 26 Jan 2007. http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=13160#
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Having said that, there is no region in the country where a single ethnic or regional identity
group that has a majority of the population. A breakdown of the population of the country, as
provided by the 2011 National Census12, is given in Table-1.
Table-1: Population of Major Ethnic and Caste Groups
Group
# Population %
1. “High-Caste” Hill people (Bahun, Chhetri) 4 8,278,401 31.2
2. Indigenous Nationalities (non-caste)
67
35.3




Mountain
Terai-Madhes (Tharus)*
Others ethnicities

3. Dalits (“low caste”)



Hill
Madhesi Dalit*

4. Madhesi (Regional Identity groups)
 Caste Madhesi
5. Muslims* (Religious identity group)
6. Unidentified
Total

50
13
4

7,228,463
2,039,407
91,852

20
5
15

34
3

27.3
7.7
0.3

12.6
2,151,526
1192,517

8.1
4.5

4072323
1,164,255
275,670
26,494,504

15.3
15.3
4.4
1.0
100

As the table shows, the dominant hill “high-caste” group, consists of Bahun and Chhetris,
who account for 31.2% of the population. The indigenous nationalities account for 35.3%, Dalits
– 12.6%, Madhesi 15.3% and Muslims – 4.4%. The Madhesi group claim that the Tharus and
Muslims, who live also in the southern Terai belt, are also Madhesi. But both the Tharus and
Muslims have rejected that claim and believe that their identity is separate from that of the
Madhesi. Ten major caste and non-caste groups in Nepal are given in the table below.

12

Government of Nepal, Central Bureau of Statistics. “Population Monograph of Nepal, 2014”.
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Table-2: Ten major Caste Groups in Nepal13
Caste or Ethnicity
Chhetri
Bahun
Magar
Tharu
Tamang
Newar
Kami
Muslim
Yadav
Rai

Total Population
4,398,053
3,226,903
1,887,733
1,737,470
1,539,830
1,321,933
1,258,554
1,164,255
1,054,458
620,004

%
16.6%
12.2%
7.1%
6.6%
5.8%
5.0%
4.8%
4.4%
4.0%
2.3%

Location
Scattered, mostly in Mid & Far West
Scattered
Western and Mid-western Hills
Terai region
Central Hills
Kathmandu valley
Scattered
Mostly in Terai, scattered
Eastern Terai
Eastern hills

According to the National Census of 2011, 123 different languages are spoken in the
country as mother tongue. Nepali, the official language, is spoken by 44.6% of the population.
Maithili, the second largest language, is mostly spoken in the Eastern Terai. Ten most spoken
languages in Nepal along with population and locations are given in the table below.
Table-3: Major languages spoken in Nepal14
Language Total population Percentage Locations
Nepali
11,826,953
44.6
Across the country
Maithili
3,092,530
11.7
Eastern Terai
Bhojpuri
1,584,958
6.0
Mid Terai
Tharu
1,529,875
5.8
Throughout Terai
Tamang
1,353,311
5.1
Central hills
Newar
846,557
3.2
Kathmandu valley
Bajjika
793,418
3.0
Eastern Terai
Magar
788,530
3.0
Western hills
Doteli
787,827
3.0
Far western hills
Urdu
691,546
2.6
Terai

13

UNDP, 2014. The Federalism Debate in Nepal. Page 64
http://www.np.undp.org/content/dam/nepal/docs/projects/UNDP_NP_SPCBN_the-federalism-debate-innepal.pdf
14
UNDP, ibid.
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b). Nepal’s Economic Structure:
The hill “high-caste” dominated unitary state created extreme economic disparity among
the caste and non-caste groups over the past two and half centuries, which is reflected in a report
prepared by the UN in Nepal (Human Development Report, UNDP, 2014). The report says that
Human Development Index (HDI) of Brahmins and Chhetris rank at the top (0.538), whereas
Ethnicities, Dalits, and Muslims have HDI values of 0.482, 0.434 and 0.422 respectively15. The
report also found that “(a)mong identified castes and ethnic groups, Hill Brahmans have the
highest HDI score at 0.557, and the Madhesi Dalits have the lowest. The Muslims and Dalits
have HDI values 27 and 24 percent lower respectively than that of the Brahmans/Chhetris”16.
(See Exibit-1 for details of the figures).

Per Capita Income
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Bahun
Chherti

Madhesi

Dalit

Ethnic
(Hill)

Ethnic
(Terai)

Muslim

All Hill

All Terai

Figure -3: Per-capita Income across Demographic Groups and Regions17

15

UNDP Human Development Report 2014, page 17
UNDP Human Development Report, 2014. Page 17-18
17
Figure based on data from UNDP, 2014 Human Development Report, page 96-99. See also Exhibit-1 for details of
the data.
16
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Nepal Living Standards Survey of 2010/2011 also found that there is a clear relation
between levels of income with caste and ethnicity. The survey showed that “Brahmans/Chhetris
have the highest income per capita, followed by the Janajati (ethnicities) and the Dalit. The per
capita income of Hill Brahman is 1.7 times higher than that of the Dalit in general, and two times
higher than that of the Madhesi Dalit”18. (See Figure -3 & 4 and Table in Exhibit - 1&2).

Economic Disparity Across Regions
2500
2000
1500
1000
500

Nepal
Eastern Region
Central Region
Western Region
Midwest
Farwest
Mountain
Hill
Terai
Eastern Mountain
Central Mountain
Western Mountain
MW Mountain
FW Mountain
Eastern Hill
Central Hill
Western Hill
MW Hill
FW Hill
Eastern Terai
Central Terai
Western Terai
Midwest Terai
FW Terai

0

Figure -4: Economic Disparity Across Regions19
If we compare the life expectancy among the different groups, we see that Bahun and
Chhetri have the highest and Dalits have the lowest. Literacy rate is highest among Bahun
Chherti and lowest among Muslims. (See Figure-5 & Exhibit – 1).

18
19

UNDP, 2014, page 18
Figure drawn by using data from UNDP, 2014, page 96-99
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Life Expentancy and Adult Literacy
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Figure – 5: Life Expectancy and Adult Literacy among Groups and Regions20
Although Nepal is traditionally an agricultural country, the industrialization process
started in the 1960s and now industry contributes about 15% of the GDP21. Industries are more
and more being concentrated in the ‘periphery’ (mostly in the Eastern Terai) which is reflected
by the industrial employment data. (See Figure – 6 below and Exhibit – 3).
The territorial structure of industrialization also shows that most of Nepal’s industries
(food processing, jute mills, sugar mills, tobacco, tea processing etc.) are located in the eastern
Terai. The Terai in general heavily contributes to the country’s national income (GDP)22,
whereas the mid and far western hills and the mountain regions are dependent on allocation from
the center.

20

Figure drawn based on data from UNDP, 2014. Page 96-99
Statista.com http://www.statista.com/statistics/425750/nepal-gdp-distribution-across-economic-sectors/
22
Gaige, 1975
21
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People employed in Industries in Different Regions
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Figure -6: Industrial Employment in Different Regions23
The structural analysis shows that there is significant economic and human development
disparity among the regions of Nepal, where the central hills have a higher level of development
but the other regions, especially the Terai are left behind. Similarly, we can see that there is
disparity among the ethnic and regional groups, where the traditional elite (Bahun and Chhetri)
have a higher status in terms of income, whereas other ethnicities and regional groups are
significantly behind.
The Dependency / Internal Colonialism theories claim that the state concentrates
industries at the Centre and exploits the periphery by making the latter as a base for raw
materials. In Nepal’s case, however, the state has supported the establishment of major industries
in the periphery (eastern Terai-Madhes), thereby making the Centre dependent on the periphery
for industrial production.

23

UNDP, 2014, page 116. Also see Exhibit-3 for details of the figures.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS
a). Research Methodology:
Guided by the theoretical propositions mentioned above, I use a mix of qualitative and
quantitative methods. Qualitative data regarding the preferences of national and regional political
parties on the federal question has been obtained from their election manifestoes and also from
media sources. On the other hand, quantitative data such as 1) votes received by major political
parties in the 2013 national elections, 2) demography and 3) economic data of the 75 districts has
been used. Regression analyses have been carried out by taking the percentage of votes received
by political parties at the district level as dependent variable; and voter turnout, economic and
demographic data of those districts as independent variables.
Although the election in 2013 was for a new constitution, and, as the main agenda of the
constitutional assembly was to decide on the federal restructuring, an assumption has been made
that the votes cast reflected the preferences of the voters on the issue of restructuring of the state;
and that the party votes represent the level of support of voters to the state restructuring agenda
proposed by the political parties. The votes received by the political parties24 on the proportional
system has been used as it better reflects voter preference in support of the manifesto of the
parties25. Due to the extreme diversity of population groups, demographic data of four major
caste or non-caste groups from each of the 75 districts, provided by the 2011 National Census,
has been used. Data on per capita income has been taken from UNDP 2014 Human Development

24

The 2013 National Election data were received from the Nepal Election commission website.
http://election.gov.np/CA2070/CAResults/reportBody.php?selectedMenu1=2&rand=1472227323
25
The assumption here is that the FPTP system will be biased for this research as voters in Nepal cast their votes
based on various other factors like kinship (nepotism), existing contacts, access to the candidate etc. Hence FPTP
votes have not been considered for this research.
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Report, whereas data on government revenue and total budget allocation to the districts has been
taken from the Consolidated Financial Statement26 of the Government of Nepal for the Fiscal
Year 2011/12.
b). Data analysis
In order to assess voter preferences regarding the restructuring agenda of regional and
national political parties, I conducted regression analysis to evaluate 13 different Models: 4
models for national political parties (NC, UML, Maoist and RPP); 8 models for regional parties
representing identity groups; and 1 model for ‘other’ minor parties. The party votes at the district
level are taken as the dependent variable reflecting voters’ preferences towards the agenda of the
political party on federal question. The independent variables are the percentages of the
population of four major demographic groups of each district, voter turnout, per capita income,
per capita government revenue and budget allocation in each of the 75 districts. While carrying
out the regressions, I excluded the dominant groups like Bahun and Chherti, as these groups are
generally considered having preferences in favor of the traditional unitary state27.
Findings of the regressions, together with coefficients, standard errors and coefficient of
determination (R^2 adjusted), have been given in the page below. The results of the tests of the
models are discussed in the next section.

26

Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal. 2011-12. Consolidated Financial Statements.
http://www.fcgo.gov.np/wp-content/uploads/Fiscal-year-2011-12-2068-69.pdf
27
A separate regression for the joint vote of NC and UML (NCUML) also shows that there is strong relation
between Bahun and Chhetri population and the votes of these political parties. See Table-4 in next page.
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Table 4- Regression Analysis: Coefficients and Standard Errors
Variables
(Intercept)

NC
UML
Maoist
RPP
Madhes
Tharuha
SLimbu
SSPN
.37**
.28
.10
.58
-.03
.01
0.0
00
(.17)
(.19)
(.19)
(.11)
(.08)
(.06)
(0.0)
(.01)
Turnout
.04
.03
.15
-.12
.04
-.02
0.0
00
(.23)
(.26)
(.25)
(.15)
(.11)
(.08)
(0.0)
(.02)
Percapita Income
0.00
0.00
-0.001** 0.001*** 0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
Percapita
0.00
0.00
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Revenue
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
Percapita Exp
0.0
0.00
0.0
0.00
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
(0.0)
(0.00)
(0.0)
(0.00)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
(0.0)
Limbu
-.16
.06
.03
0.0
-.02
-.02
.01***
.05***
(.10)
(.12)
(.11)
(.07)
(.05)
(.03)
(.003)
(.01)
Sherpa
.36
-.22
.61
-.57**
-.03
-.07
-.01
-.28***
(.40)
(.45)
(.43)
(.26)
(.20)
(.14)
(.01)
(.03)
Rai
-.15
.13
0.00
-.08
-.01
-.04
0.0
.21***
(.13)
(.15)
(.14)
(.09)
(.06)
(.05)
(0.0)
(.01)
Madhesi Tribal
-.68
.51
.48
.25
.61*
-.18
-.003
.12*
(.63)
(.72)
(.68)
(.42)
(.31)
(.23)
(.01)
(.06)
Tharu
-.85*
-.21*
.13
0.00
.01
.19***
0.0
0.0
(.09)
(.11)
(.10)
(.06)
(.04)
(.03)
(0.0)
(0.0)
Muslim
-.57**
-.17
-.25
.15
.40***
.27***
0.0
.01
(.24)
(.27)
(.26)
(.16)
(.12)
(.08)
(0.0)
(.02)
Magar
-.08
-.27
.22**
-.07
.00
-.02
0.0
0.0
(.07)
(.08)
(.08)
(.05)
(.03)
(.02)
(0.0)
(0.0)
Tamang
-.16**
.02
.25***
.02
-.02
-.02
0.0
0.0
(.07)
(.08)
(.08)
(.05)
(.03)
(.02)
(0.0)
(0.0)
Newar
-.23*
-.27*
0.00
.20**
-.02
0.00
0.0
00
(.13)
(.15)
(.14)
(.09)
(.06)
(.04)
(0.0)
(.01)
Madhesi
-.41**
-.50*** -.08
-.06
.73***
0.00
0.0
00
(.16)
(.18)
(.17)
(.11)
(.08)
(.06)
(0.0)
(.01)
Madhesi Dalit
.21
1.13
.71
.25
-2.1***
.51
-.001
.01
(1.22)
(1.37)
(1.31)
(.81)
(.60)
(.44)
(.03)
(.12)
Gurung
.03
-.53
.42**
-.20*
-.05
-.05
0.0
00
(.18)
(.20)
(.19)
(.12)
(.09)
(.06)
(0.0)
(.01)
Hill Dalit
-.11
.03
-.01
.03
-.02
00
0.0
0.0
(.08)
(.09)
(.09)
(.05)
(.04)
(.03)
(0.0)
(0.0)
Thakali
-.52
-.59
-1.13**
.18
.02
00
00
-.06
(.44)
(.49)
(.47)
(.29)
(.21)
(.15)
(.01)
(.04)
R^2 Adj.
0.30
0.275
0.269
0.510
0.813
0.530
.186
.851
Standard errors are in brackets. Codes of Significance: *** => p = 0.01; ** => p = 0.05; * => p = 0.10.

Dalit
00
(.01)
00
(.01)
00
(00)
00
(00)
00
(00)
00
(00)
00
(.02)
00
(.01)
-.03
(.04)
0.0
(0.0)
.04**
(.01)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
.02**
(.01)
-.08
(.08)
00
(.01)
00
(00)
00
(.03)
0.291

Khamp
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
-.001
(.003)
00
(.001)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
-0.198

Janamu
-.02
(.02)
.02
(.02)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
00
(.01)
00
(.05)
00
(.01)
-.02
(.07)
00
(.01)
.02
(.03)
.02**
(.009)
0.0
(0.0)
00
(.01)
-.02
(.02)
.06
(.15)
00
(.02)
-.02**
(.01)
-.03
(.05)
-0.157

Newa
-.01
(.006)
.01
(.008)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0***
(0.0)
0.0**
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
00
(.01)
0.0
(0.0)
00
(.02)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
-.008***
(.002)
.05***
(.004)
0.0
(0.0)
.009
(.04)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
-.02
(.01)
0.812

Others
(.14
.12)
.02
(.17)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
.03
(.07)
.27
(.28)
00
(.09)
.01
(.45)
.04
(.07)
.09
(.17)
-.02
(.05)
-.07
(.05)
.29***
(.09)
.32
(.11)
-.63***
(.87)
-.07
(.13)
.09
(.05)
1.65***
(.31)
0.445
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c). Findings and Discussion
In this section, analysis has been made on the results obtained from the regression
analysis by using various theories of regionalism: Institutional Theory, Internal Colonialism,
Social Communication and Primordialism.
Institutional theory claims that in modernizing societies, because of increased education
and economic development, many oppressed groups strive to participate in the political process,
but the system does not allow them to participate, and alienates them, thereby creating conflict in
the society. Samuel Huntington (1968) has called this phenomenon as the ‘institutional gap’.
This means that, as the traditional elites alienate the marginalized groups from the political
mainstream; this alienation reinforces the identities of these groups and generates a common
political preference in order to fight the discriminatory policies of the traditional dominant actors
who control power of the state.
One of the major caste group that has been discriminated in the Nepali society are the
Dalits, who are treated as “untouchables” and do not have access to public places (e.g. places of
worship), public services (e.g. education and healthcare) and are not adequately represented in
the decision-making structures. The Dalits have their own political party (The Dalit Janajati
Party is the major one). There are countless Dalit civil society organizations working throughout
the country for raising awareness and educational status of Dalits and for empowering them to
claim their rights.
If Huntington’s Institutional theory is valid, we should see a strong unity of preference of
Dalit voters with the political party representing their political interests. However, this is not the
case. The regression analysis shows no significant association between this party’s federal
restructuring agenda (non-territorial Electoral College for Dalits) and the Dalit population both in
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the hills and the Terai. This means that Dalits in Nepal (12.5% of the population) are divided in
their preferences and do not support political party that was established to represent their
interests. Instead of the Dalits, there appears to be some association between the Dalit Janajati
Party preferences with the Muslims (coef=0.04, r^2=0.291) and a section of the Madhesi group
(coef=0.02, r^2=0.291).
The lack of Dalit support to their political party may be due to several reasons. First of
all, the Dalit population is scattered across the country and their leaders are ideologically divided
among the main political parties. Another reason is that Dalits are divided among themselves
with their own internal caste system, and the lower caste Dalits do not support the “Dalit
Brahmins” who have a dominant position in Dalit organizations. Dalits are also divided
regionally, as the Dalits in the Terai see the hill Dalits belonging to the dominant hill people. As
the Dalits speak the same language and practice the same religion as that of the dominant group,
they have not been able to clearly articulate their identity and initiate a strong campaign.
Therefore, we conclude that, political alienation of the hitherto marginalized group by the elite
does not automatically create unity in the marginalized group, as claimed by Samuel
Huntington’s Institutional Theory.
Theory of Internal Colonialism of Michael Hechter (1975) claims that the state at the
Centre creates economic and cultural dependency in the ‘periphery’ and reinforces separate
identities in the regions as a response to the internal colonial policies and practices. Let us test
this theory in the cases of Madhesi and Newari communities in Nepal.
Some groups in Terai-Madhesh claim that the state has practiced internal colonialism and
has marginalized their community culturally and economically for a long time. The issue of
Madhesh first came up in the 1950s when some local groups started demanding autonomy for the
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region. Later, Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP), established in 1985, started advocating for the
political rights of the Madhesi. However, the party split in 2003, and now consists of half a
dozen outfits. In 2007, two other parties, namely, Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum (MJF) and Terai
Madhesh Lokatantrik Party (TMLP) were established. However, MJF also split into several
groups the following year. These different parties would-be representing the Madhesi community
have demanded a single Madhesh province (or a maximum of two provinces) in the southern
Terai region.
Historically, the people of the Terai-Madhesh could not be integrated into the national
“mainstream” due to various reasons. First of all, malaria was prevalent in the Terai, where
people from the hills could not live. Secondly, there was a belt of dense forest at the foothills that
separated the communities in the hill and Terai28. The people in the Terai did not speak Nepali,
and therefore they faced difficulty in getting government jobs (Gaige, 1975). However, after the
eradication of malaria in the 1950s, the government initiated resettlement schemes of hill people
in the Terai.
In the 1960s, the autocratic monarchy initiated the process of Nepalization by imposing
Nepali language in the Terai to strengthen mono-ethnic nationalism. Citizenship became a key
issue in the Terai as the royal government could not establish a fair and workable procedure to
identify who was a Nepali citizen and who was Indian and failed to distribute citizenship
certificates to the citizens in a systematic way. During the brief period of democracy in the
1950s, the political parties worked as a “melting-pot” for the diverse groups of both the hill and
the Terai. However, after the ban against political parties in 1960, the process of national
integration became stalled.

28

This forest was perceived by the then rulers as a natural defense from any threat coming from the south (India),
especially from the British.
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If Michael Hechter’s theory of Internal Colonialism was valid, we should have seen
strong unity of preferences among the various groups living in the Terai, which is not the case.
There is association between the votes of a section of caste Madhesi, Muslims, and Madhesi
Tribals with the agenda of the Madhesi parties, but other major groups like Tharus, and Dalits do
not appear to prefer the Madhesi agenda. In fact, the Madhesi Dalit have a significant negative
association with the preferences of the Madhesi parties. And the Tharus, who are considered as
the indigenous population of the Terai, appear to have no association with the preferences of the
Madhesi parties. If we see the actual voting patterns, in Dhanusha District, which is located at
the very heart of the proposed Madhesh province, the Madhesi Parties jointly received 15% of
the votes on the proportional system, whereas the national parties received 55%.
Another group who claim of internal colonialism by the state is the Newar community
who mostly live mostly in the Kathmandu valley. During the unification of the country in the
second half of 18th century, the King of Gorkha had invaded the Newar kingdoms of the valley,
and since then, some Newari groups think that the Gorkha (later named as Nepal) state has
marginalized their community by suppressing their language, culture and identity. Having said
that, the Newars are considered to be the third most powerful group in the country after Bahuns
and Chhetris. The Nepa National Party is the largest party representing the Newar community,
which has demanded an autonomous ethnic Newa State in the Kathmandu valley.
The regression analysis shows some association of Newar voters with the Newa National
Party. But, there is a significant association of the Newar community with the votes obtained by
monarchist RPP and ‘other’ fringe parties, who oppose ethnicity based federalism. These results
show that, in a stratified and demographically diverse society like Nepal, Hechter’s theory of
Internal Colonialism is inadequate to explain the regional question.
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Karl Deutsch has proposed a social communication theory, which claims that in the
process of modernization, the increased mobilization and communication reinforces regional and
national identities. He also claimed that the nature of communication (standard stream) from the
state interacts with the historical ‘peculiar stream’ of the ethnic groups and creates a ‘feedback
stream’ as a response to the state’s dominant communication (standard stream). He also claimed
that the process of assimilation or dissimilation of the marginalized groups depends on which
stream gets the upper hand: standard stream or feedback stream. Let us test this theory in the
cases of the Limbu and Rai communities of eastern Nepal.
The Limbu community is an ethnic group living in the far eastern hills of Nepal. This
group is represented by the Federal Limbuwan State Council who has demanded an autonomous
Limbuwan State in the nine districts of far eastern Nepal29. This party is one of the most active in
political mobilization to claim identity rights for the Limbus. In this area, there is also a large
community of Rai people, who have also demanded a separate homeland for themselves, a Kirat
Province. Because of the overlapping territorial claims between these two groups, there is no
clarity on a clear division of territory among them.
According to the theory of Social Communication, we should expect a strong unity of
political preferences within Rai and Limbu communities only if the communication takes place
through the particular streams. However, the regression analysis shows a weak relation between
the preferences of these communities with their political parties on the federal question. The
association of the preferences of Limbu voters with the Limbuwan Party is very weak. Similarly,
the association of the preferences of the Rai voters with their ethnic Khambuwan Party is also
very weak (coef.=0.00, r^2=-0.198). Another regional party active in this region is the Federal

29

Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limbuwan
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Socialist Party Nepal (SSPN). There appears to be some association of the Limbu and Rai voters
with SSPN. If we see the actual voting patterns in the area, we see that in Ilam district (i.e. at the
very heart of the proposed ethnic Limbuwan state), the largest regional party (SSPN) received
only 7% of the proportional votes, whereas the national parties received 78% of the votes. The
ethnic parties of the Limbus and Rais (Limbuwan and Khambuwan) received a negligible
percent of the votes from their own ethnic communities. This indicates that the relation between
SSPN and the Rai and Limbu voters may be due to historical reasons30 rather than the effect of
social communication. If social communication had played a role here, we could have seen
stronger association between the Khambuwan and Limbuwan parties with their ethnic
constituencies. This also doesn’t look like the victory of the ‘dominant’ stream because the
struggle of the local ethnic groups for their identity is also ongoing. This indicates that there is
neither assimilation nor dissimilation of the ethnicities as prescribed by the theory of Social
Communication.
Clifford Geertz’s (1973) concept of Primordialism claims that group identity emerges
naturally as a result of long period of cohabitation and the common experiences of language,
culture, kinship, region etc. that consolidate bond between individuals. If Geertz’s theory is true,
we shall see a strong correlation between the demands of the ethnic parties with the individual
preferences of the voters during elections. We have tested this theory in the cases of the Tharus,
and Magar communities in Nepal.
The Tharus are considered as an indigenous group living throughout the Terai belt in the
south of the country. They are tribal peoples of the Terai, who cleared the forests, cultivated the

30

SSPN is a new regional party formed by the breakaway faction of one of the major national parties. It is a new
party and its credentials as the guardian of ethnic identity of the local groups is still early to judge. The votes it
received could be from the former supporters of the national party (UML) to which the leaders of SSPN belonged.
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land and moved from place to place. After the eradication of malaria in the Terai in 1950s, the
Terai has become migration destination both from the hills in the north and from India to the
south. Due to this migration, the Tharus lost their land to the migrants and slowly became
marginalized in their own ancestral lands. On the other hand, the Magars are considered as the
indigenous peoples of Nepal who live in the western hills of the country.
Regression analysis on the preferences of these ‘primordial’ groups shows that there is
some association between the preferences of the groups to the political parties who represent
them. The Tharu have their political parties like the Tharuhat Party and the Madhesi Janaadhikar
Forum Lokatantrik (MJFL). The key demand of this group is Tharuhat, an ethnic homeland for
the Tharus in the Terai-Madhesh. There is association on the preferences of the Tharus with
Tharu political parties. The reason for the association seems to be not the primordial bond, but
external demographic pressure from the settlers – both from the hills and the Terai. Especially,
there is deep distrust between the Madhesi and the Tharus, and the Tharus have rejected Madhesi
claim that they are also Madhesi. The Tharus believe that if they become Madhesi, they will not
only lose their identity, but also their land to the Madhesi. Therefore, the Tharu support to their
political parties appears more like a reaction against the Madhesi attempt for their assimilation,
rather than internal primordial bonds between the Tharus. Bardiya district in the mid-west is
considered to have the highest population of the Tharus in the country (53%, as per census
2011). However, in Bardiya, the national parties jointly received 77% of the votes, whereas the
Tharu parties jointly received only 7% of the votes. These figures indicate that Tharu political
preferences are divided ideologically favoring national political parties, rather than being united
by the primordial bonds to claim their political rights.
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The ethnic Magar community is represented by the Rastriya Janamukti Party which has
demanded Magarat, a homeland for their ethnic group. The regression analysis shows weak
association between the preferences of the Magars with the Rastriya Janamukti Party. However,
there is stronger association of Magar preferences with the Maoist Party. This is because, the
Maoist movement started in mid 1990s with their “base-area” in the proposed Magarat region of
the western hills, due to which a section of the Magars became ideologically indoctrinated.
Therefore, in the case of Magars, there is no conclusive evidence that primordial bond has
caused unity of political preferences. Palpa district is considered as having the highest population
of Magar ethnicity in the country (52%, as per census 2011). If we see the actual voting patterns
here, the national parties jointly received 86% of the votes, whereas the Janamukti Party, the
ethnic party of the Magars, received only 2.5% of the votes. This shows, that, like the Tharus, the
Magars are also ideologically divided in their preferences and favor the national political parties,
rather than being united in their preferences to translate their primordial ties into political capital
to achieve the ethnic Magarat state.
As a summary of the analysis of the regression on the models of preferences of the
identity groups and the political parties, we see that voters of the ethnic group are generally
divided in their political preferences regarding the federal question. From this analysis, we
conclude that the ethnic and identity groups in Nepal are in general divided along the ideological
lines of the national political parties and the existing theories such as Internal Colonialism,
Social Communication, Primordialism and Institutional Theory cannot adequately explain the
regional question in Nepal.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Nepal is a country with extreme socio-economic as well as demographic, cultural and
regional diversity. Since the re-establishment of democracy after the second popular movement
in 2006, there is ongoing debate regarding the federal question and granting political rights to the
diverse ethnic and regional identity groups. Due to historical discrimination and marginalization
of the identity groups, ethnic and regional movements are ongoing. At the same time, the
political actors in the country are making efforts to find a long-lasting solution of this important
question. Despite the discrimination and marginalization of the identity groups, the current
research shows that, the preferences of voters from these groups on the federal question are
divided along the ideological lines of the national political parties who oppose identity based
federalism. Another important finding is that there is lack of coordination, communication and
solidarity within the groups to fight the unitary state at the centre. How do the findings of this
research stand with respect to the theories of regionalism?
In order to explain the regional phenomenon of Nepal, we had started this research with
the theoretical propositions of the Internal Colonialism, Primordialism, Institutional Theory, and
theory of Social Communication. Let us use the findings of the research to test these theories for
possible explanation of the regional question in Nepal.
Samuel Huntington’s Institutional Theory (1968) claimed that democratic transition in
multi-ethnic societies of emerging states could be destabilizing as the hitherto oppressed groups
who come to the political arena do not find institutional space for participation, and get alienated
from the political process, leading to conflict in the society. Dalits in Nepal are one of such
marginalized groups, who have been traditionally discriminated and marginalized and are
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waging a struggle to establish their political rights since the establishment of democracy in 1950.
If the Institutional Theory was valid, we would have seen a strong unity and coordination among
the Nepali Dalits to fight the non-secular unitary state, and their political preferences would have
been in alignment with the Dalit Political parties who have been demanding dalit rights. This
research, however, shows that, there is no unity of preferences between Dalit voters and the Dalit
political parties, especially the Dalit Janajati Party. Despite of the very active Dalit civil society
organizations in Nepal31 who are educating their community and advocating for Dalit rights,
Dalit voters both in the Hills and in the Terai appear to be divided along the ideological lines of
the national political parties, who oppose identity based federalism. Therefore, the Institutional
Theory cannot adequately explain the federal question in Nepal.
Michael Hechter’s theory of Internal Colonialism (1975) suggested that economic
exploitation and socio-cultural domination by the Centre creates dependency of the periphery on
the centre, and strengthens regional identities in the periphery. In Nepal’s case, some of the
ethnic and regional identity groups, namely the Madhesi and the Newari groups, claim that the
state has used internal colonial approach in relation to them, and therefore, their demand for
identity based federalism should be honored. If Hechter’s Theory of Internal Colonialism was
valid, we would have seen a strong unity of preferences among Madhesi and Newari groups with
their regional and ethnic political parties. But we do not see any such unity of preferences among
voters of these groups. Especially in the Terai-Madhesh, we see that significant local groups like
the Tharus, and Madhesi Dalits do not appear to prefer the regional identity claims of the
Madhesi parties. In fact, there is a negative association between the Madhesi Dalit and the
preferences of the Madhesi parties, which is against the claims of the theory of Internal

31

See Dalit NGO Federation in Nepal, http://www.dnfnepal.org/
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Colonialism. Similarly, in the Newari case, there appears to be a stronger association with the
monarchist RPP that prefers unitary state rather than with the ethnic party of the Newars.
Therefore, in the context of Nepal, where there is extreme diversity and stratification of society,
Hechter’s theory (Internal Colonialism) is inadequate to explain the regional question.
Karl Deutsch’s (1953) theory of Social Communication claimed that modernization leads
to social mobilization and communication within the marginalized groups and reinforces
regional and national identities in them. This theory also asserted that the process of
communication flowing from the state to these groups can create assimilation or dissimilation
depending on whether the ‘standard stream’ or the ‘feedback stream’ gets the upper hand. I have
tested this theory on the preferences of the ethnicities in Nepal.
The Limbu ethnic group in far eastern hills is one of the most active ethnic movements in
the country. However, this research shows that, the association of preferences of the Limbu
voters with their political party (Federal Limbuwan State Council) is very weak. There appears
to be some association between the preferences of the Rai and Limbu with the SSPN, a new
regional party. However, SSPN is a new party formed by the breakaway faction of one of the
national parties (UML) and it is early to judge how far this party will be committed to the
demands of ethnicity based federalism. Despite the association of a section of ethnic voters to
SSPN, national parties opposing ethnic federalism received absolute majority of votes in those
districts, which shows that the Rais and Limbus are also ideologically divided rather than united
as prescribed by the theory of social communication.
Far eastern Nepal is also relatively developed in terms of education and communication.
There are 15 local FM radios in the area32, not to speak of numerous other local or national
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electronic and print media. In spite of these mediums of communication, we see neither
assimilation nor dissimilation of the Limbus or the Rais through the processes of ‘standard’ and
‘feedback’ streams. The process of Social Communication has not created strong solidarity
among ethnic voters in support of the preferences of their ethnic political parties.
Clifford Geertz’s (1973) concept of Primordialism is also used to explain regional
phenomena. This theory claims that common experiences of history, language, culture, kinship,
region, beliefs etc. lead to primordial identities. In Nepal, there are various groups who claim to
be primordial to the land. The Magar33 and the Tharu are such groups. This research shows that,
there is some association of the Tharus with the political preferences of their political parties, but
this seems to be due to external factors (pressure from the Madhesi for assimilation) rather than
internal primordial bonds. On the other hand, there appears to be no coordination between the
parties claiming to champion the rights of the Tharus, namely, the MJFL and the Tharuhat as
these party fought elections against one another in the same constituencies. The Tharuhat Party
has taken a stronger line in the demand for ethnic state, but the MJFL seems to be vacillating34
and has seldom shown opportunistic behavior.
In the case of Magars, the association of their political preferences with their ethnic party
is very weak, but the association with the Maoist party is very strong. This appears to be due to
ideological indoctrination of the Magars, as the area used to be the “base-area” of the Maoists
during their military campaign. Therefore, Geertz’s concept of Primordialism is unable to
explain the political behavior among identity groups of Nepal.
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From the above analysis, it is clear that the existing theories of regionalism cannot
adequately explain the regional question in Nepal, which leads us to the question of the
peculiarities of the electoral system for possible answers. In Nepal, there’s a mixed system of
voting: the first past the post (FPTP) and the proportional system. Proportional voting was
introduced in 2008 to encourage the participation of even smaller ethnic and regional groups in
the structures of the state. Despite this, voters of regional and ethnic identity groups have
preferred national political parties rather than their own ethnic and regional parties.
If we look into the electoral system in neighboring India, there is no proportional
electoral system, therefore, it is difficult to make a judgement of the regional question. But in
Nepal, however, the proportional representation system gives a better measure of the regional
aspiration of the voters. This makes the study of the regionalism in Nepal still more interesting
and important. Despite the provision of the proportional representation system through which
majority (335 out of 601) of the members of national parliament are elected, the voters of the
ethnic and regional groups seem to be divided in their political preferences. This raises serious
theoretical questions and challenges the scholars of regionalism to study the case of Nepal in
order to develop new theories.
The divided preferences of the identity groups have also protracted the process of Nepal’s
democratic transition. Andre Lecours has rightly said that in a developing country like Nepal,
restructuring of state can be a very difficult and protracted process due to extreme diversity, long
history of autocratic regimes, fragile democracy vulnerable to external influence, (Lecours,
2012)35. Neither the autocratic monarchy nor the liberal parties who came to power had
visualized the need for federalization of the country. The federalization agenda came from the
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opposition groups, who mobilized the ethnic and regional issues to achieve their own political
objectives. Therefore, as Lecours says, Nepal is an “accidental federation” where liberal political
parties were compelled to accept the federal agenda due to historical circumstances.
Similarly, analyzing the Indian experience of federalization, Sunil Khilnani (1999) says
that the Indian liberals who came to power after independence in 1947 focused on the group
rights, instead of following on the prescriptions of their own liberal ideology (i.e. to focus on the
universal rights of the individual). The focus on “group right” policy of India’s founding fathers
led to benefit the elites of each of these identity groups, whereas the plight of the poor and
disadvantaged in every identity group has remained the same even after 60 years of
independence36. This gives us some indication that, in emerging new states, the rights of the
identity groups should be accompanied with the universal rights of citizens so that the poor and
marginalized within each group could also be brought into the mainstream and not only the elite
of those groups. On the question of individual rights vs. the group rights, Clifford Geertz (1963),
argues that the leaders of the emerging new states should adopt policies to reform the state in
order to “domesticate primordial attachments” and “reconcile them with the unfolding civil
order” and also by “neutralizing the apparatus of the state” in relation to the identity groups and
also by “channeling discontent into properly political rather than para-political forms of
expression”37
Based on the findings of this research, I recommend that, for the national integration of
Nepal, the ideas of Geertz on reforming the state and of Khilnani on fulfilling the universal rights
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of citizens should go hand in hand. Having said that, I urge the scholars of political science to
conduct more research on the “Nepal Puzzle” in order to enrich the theory of regionalism.
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EXHIBITS


Exhibit (1): Economic disparity across identity groups (UNDP 2014, p 96-99)
Caste/Ethnicity Life Expectancy Adult Literacy Per Capita Income HDI Index
Bahun Chherti
73.99
76.32
1115
0.538
Madhesi
72.35
53.93
732
0.46
Dalit
67.19
52.27
755
0.434
Ethnic (Hill)
69.86
66.93
844
0.482
Ethnic (Terai)
69.44
62.24
822
0.473
Muslim
70.47
43.56
695
0.422
All Hill
70.25
72.35
1056
0.511
All Terai
70.95
53.27
744
0.454



Exhibit – (2): Economic Disparity Across Regions (UNDP, 2014, p. 96-99)

Region
All Nepal
Eastern Region
Central Region
Western Region
Midwest
Farwest
Mountain
Hill
Terai



GNI per capita Region
1160 Eastern Mountain
1088 Central Mountain
Western
1429 Mountain
1104
906
767
965
1316
1052

MW Mountain
FW Mountain
Eastern Hill
Central Hill
Western Hill
MW Hill
FW Hill

GNI Per
capita

Region

GNI per
capita

1407 Eastern Terai
1077 Central Terai
Western
2329 Terai
Midwest
811 Terai
538 FW Terai
1107
1878
1100
745
643

Exhibit - (3): People Employed in Different Regions (UNDP 2014, p.116)
Region
1997 2002 2007
Kathmandu valley
99383 63993 38909
Central Eastern Hills
9211 7492 8227
Western Hills
5352 6175 6887
MFW Hills
544 451 524
Eastern Central Mountains 1383 802 537
WMW, FW Mountains
70
53
125
Eastern central Terai
59196 83832 92360
Western Terai
12376 17589 18092
MFW Terai
9993 11466 11889

1047
1045
1097
1117
940
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